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Second mover disadvantages in a three-player stackelberg game with uncertain demand : irreversible commitment and information
https://kobe-cufs.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/1231
https://kobe-cufs.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/1231dbf7651a-5b62-49f7-a03e-6f137ffeef80
| Item type | 研究報告書 / Research Paper(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 1999-04-13 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Second mover disadvantages in a three-player stackelberg game with uncertain demand : irreversible commitment and information | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18ws | |||||
| 資源タイプ | research report | |||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
| 著者 |
Shinkai, Tetsuya
× Shinkai, Tetsuya |
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| 著者所属機関 | ||||||
| 値 | Kobe City University of Foreign studies | |||||
| 雑誌名 |
en : Kobe city university of foreign studies working paper series 号 4, p. 1-30, 発行日 1999-04-13 |
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| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | Institute for foreign studies Kobe city university of foreign studies | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | I consider a three-player Stackrlberg game where each player has its private signal concerning stochastic demand. I show that at a perfectly revealing equilibrium, the second mover earns the lowest and the third mover the highest expected profit of the three. I characterize this result by the strategic substitutes or complements relationships among three firms at the equilibrium. Furthermore, considering other equilibria, one of and both of the first mover and the second movers take a pooling strategy, I show that the perfectly revealing equilibrium dominates over these other equilibria. | |||||
| 分類 | ||||||
| 値 | JEL classification numbers:C72,D82,L13 | |||||
