{"created":"2023-06-23T12:28:39.254538+00:00","id":1231,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"16168a71-e7a5-407a-8f59-71ae8a68f8d2"},"_deposit":{"created_by":22,"id":"1231","owners":[22],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"1231"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:kobe-cufs.repo.nii.ac.jp:00001231","sets":["75"]},"author_link":["445"],"item_10007_biblio_info_24":{"attribute_name":"雑誌名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"1999-04-13","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicIssueNumber":"4","bibliographicPageEnd":"30","bibliographicPageStart":"1","bibliographic_titles":[{},{"bibliographic_title":"Kobe city university of foreign studies working paper series","bibliographic_titleLang":"en"}]}]},"item_10007_description_13":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"I consider a three-player Stackrlberg game where each player has its private signal concerning stochastic demand. I show that at a perfectly revealing equilibrium, the second mover earns the lowest and the third mover the highest expected profit of the three. I characterize this result by the strategic substitutes or complements relationships among three firms at the equilibrium. Furthermore, considering other equilibria, one of and both of the first mover and the second movers take a pooling strategy, I show that the perfectly revealing equilibrium dominates over these other equilibria.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_10007_publisher_25":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"Institute for foreign studies Kobe city university of foreign studies"}]},"item_10007_text_11":{"attribute_name":"著者所属機関","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Kobe City University of Foreign studies"}]},"item_10007_text_26":{"attribute_name":"分類","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"JEL classification numbers:C72,D82,L13"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Shinkai, Tetsuya"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"445","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"research report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18ws"}]},"item_title":"Second mover disadvantages in a three-player stackelberg game with uncertain demand : irreversible commitment and information","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Second mover disadvantages in a three-player stackelberg game with uncertain demand : irreversible commitment and information"}]},"item_type_id":"10007","owner":"22","path":["75"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"1999-04-13"},"publish_date":"1999-04-13","publish_status":"0","recid":"1231","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Second mover disadvantages in a three-player stackelberg game with uncertain demand : irreversible commitment and information"],"weko_creator_id":"22","weko_shared_id":-1},"updated":"2023-06-23T13:13:41.394786+00:00"}