@techreport{oai:kobe-cufs.repo.nii.ac.jp:00001231,
 author = {Shinkai, Tetsuya},
 issue = {4},
 month = {Apr},
 note = {I consider a three-player Stackrlberg game where each player has its private signal concerning stochastic demand. I show that at a perfectly revealing equilibrium, the second mover earns the lowest and the third mover the highest expected profit of the three. I characterize this result by the strategic substitutes or complements relationships among three firms at the equilibrium. Furthermore, considering other equilibria, one of and both of the first mover and the second movers take a pooling strategy, I show that the perfectly revealing equilibrium dominates over these other equilibria.},
 title = {Second mover disadvantages in a three-player stackelberg game with uncertain demand : irreversible commitment and information},
 year = {1999}
}