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Conjectural variations and public good provision in a repeated game setting
https://kobe-cufs.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/1228
https://kobe-cufs.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/1228c53d048f-2827-4b40-b2ab-e28e303255cd
| Item type | 研究報告書 / Research Paper(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2000-06-05 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Conjectural variations and public good provision in a repeated game setting | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | private provision | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | public good | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Nash equilibrium | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | subgame perfect equilibrium | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | conjectural variation | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | repeated game | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18ws | |||||
| 資源タイプ | research report | |||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
| 著者 |
Itaya, Jun-ichi
× Itaya, Jun-ichi× Okamura, Makoto |
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| 著者所属機関 | ||||||
| 値 | Hokkaido University | |||||
| 著者所属機関 | ||||||
| 値 | Kobe City University of Foreign studies | |||||
| 雑誌名 |
en : Kobe city university of foreign studies working paper series 号 8, p. 1-24, 発行日 2000-06-05 |
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| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | Institute for foreign studies Kobe city university of foreign studies | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | The purpose of this paper is to show conjectural variations can be derived as a reduced form in an infinitely repeated game of private provision to public goods. We obtain explicit closed forms of conjectural variations associated with optimal equilibria in which the sum of the utilities of all community’s members is maximized both for quadratic and Cobb-Douglas preferences, provided that the resulting sequence of contributions can be sustained as a Nash(or subgame prefect) equilibrium in the corresponding repeated game. We also show that positive conjectural variations will emerge, as long as people place any weight at all on the future, and that those conjectures are positively are positively related to the discount factor. In particular, since it turns out that the conjectural variations depend on individual income under Cobb-Douglas preferences, income redistribution across contributors will alter aggregate provision of public goods, thus undermining Warr’s neutrality theorem. | |||||
| 分類 | ||||||
| 値 | JEL classification numbers:C72,D64,H41 | |||||
