{"created":"2023-06-23T12:28:39.055257+00:00","id":1228,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"6a67ef8d-b260-4d1f-a89c-1619e615ccca"},"_deposit":{"created_by":22,"id":"1228","owners":[22],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"1228"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:kobe-cufs.repo.nii.ac.jp:00001228","sets":["75"]},"author_link":["453","442"],"item_10007_biblio_info_24":{"attribute_name":"雑誌名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2000-06-05","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicIssueNumber":"8","bibliographicPageEnd":"24","bibliographicPageStart":"1","bibliographic_titles":[{},{"bibliographic_title":"Kobe city university of foreign studies working paper series","bibliographic_titleLang":"en"}]}]},"item_10007_description_13":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"The purpose of this paper is to show conjectural variations can be derived as a reduced form in an infinitely repeated game of private provision to public goods. We obtain explicit closed forms of conjectural variations associated with optimal equilibria in which the sum of the utilities of all community’s members is maximized both for quadratic and Cobb-Douglas preferences, provided that the resulting sequence of contributions can be sustained as a Nash(or subgame prefect) equilibrium in the corresponding repeated game. We also show that positive conjectural variations will emerge, as long as people place any weight at all on the future, and that those conjectures are positively are positively related to the discount factor. In particular, since it turns out that the conjectural variations depend on individual income under Cobb-Douglas preferences, income redistribution across contributors will alter aggregate provision of public goods, thus undermining Warr’s neutrality theorem.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_10007_publisher_25":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"Institute for foreign studies Kobe city university of foreign studies"}]},"item_10007_text_11":{"attribute_name":"著者所属機関","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Hokkaido University"},{"subitem_text_value":"Kobe City University of Foreign studies"}]},"item_10007_text_26":{"attribute_name":"分類","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"JEL classification numbers:C72,D64,H41"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Itaya, Jun-ichi"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"453","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Okamura, Makoto"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"442","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"private provision","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"public good","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Nash equilibrium","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"subgame perfect equilibrium","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"conjectural variation","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"repeated game","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"research report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18ws"}]},"item_title":"Conjectural variations and public good provision in a repeated game setting","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Conjectural variations and public good provision in a repeated game setting"}]},"item_type_id":"10007","owner":"22","path":["75"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2000-06-05"},"publish_date":"2000-06-05","publish_status":"0","recid":"1228","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Conjectural variations and public good provision in a repeated game setting"],"weko_creator_id":"22","weko_shared_id":-1},"updated":"2023-06-23T13:13:43.813615+00:00"}