@techreport{oai:kobe-cufs.repo.nii.ac.jp:00001228,
 author = {Itaya, Jun-ichi and Okamura, Makoto},
 issue = {8},
 month = {Jun},
 note = {The purpose of this paper is to show conjectural variations can be derived as a reduced form in an infinitely repeated game of private provision to public goods. We obtain explicit closed forms of conjectural variations associated with optimal equilibria in which the sum of the utilities of all community’s members is maximized both for quadratic and Cobb-Douglas preferences, provided that the resulting sequence of contributions can be sustained as a Nash(or subgame prefect) equilibrium in the corresponding repeated game. We also show that positive conjectural variations will emerge, as long as people place any weight at all on the future, and that those conjectures are positively are positively related to the discount factor. In particular, since it turns out that the conjectural variations depend on individual income under Cobb-Douglas preferences, income redistribution across contributors will alter aggregate provision of public goods, thus undermining Warr’s neutrality theorem.},
 title = {Conjectural variations and public good provision in a repeated game setting},
 year = {2000}
}