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Sunk costs of capital and predominance of investor-owned firms in market economies
https://kobe-cufs.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/1221
https://kobe-cufs.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/1221344f8c31-56fe-4309-a3a3-e8421a8b2812
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
ダウンロード (2.3 MB)
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| Item type | 研究報告書 / Research Paper(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2004-12-01 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Sunk costs of capital and predominance of investor-owned firms in market economies | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Sunk costs of capital | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | asymmetric information | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | business risk | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | investor-owned firm | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | worker-owned firm | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18ws | |||||
| 資源タイプ | research report | |||||
| 著者 |
Minami, Kazuhiko
× Minami, Kazuhiko× Tanaka, Satoru |
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| 著者所属機関 | ||||||
| 値 | University of Hyogo | |||||
| 著者所属機関 | ||||||
| 値 | Kobe City University of Foreign studies | |||||
| 雑誌名 |
en : Kobe city university of foreign studies working paper series 号 17, p. 1-25, 発行日 2004-12 |
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| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | Institute for foreign studies Kobe city university of foreign studies | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | This paper examines why investor-owned firms are predominant in market economies. It is assumed that firm owners and outside traders are asymmetrically informed of venture risks, and that are sunk costs associated with investment in physical and human capital. Then, we undertake an efficiency comparison between investor-owned and worker-owned firms. We find that it is efficient when the input supplier (the investor or worker) who incurs large sunk costs owns the firm. This is because such an input supplier can credibly signal to the other input supplier that he in fact has a safe project. An empirical study based on the Japanese manufacturing industry seems to support the theoretical result. | |||||
| 分類 | ||||||
| 値 | JEL classification numbers:P12,P13,L22,L23 | |||||
| 他の研究成果との関係 | ||||||
| 関連名称 | The revised version of this WP was published : "Sunk costs of capital and the form of enterprise : investor-owned firms and worker-owned firms." Annals of public and cooperative economics, Vol.81, No.1, 2010 : pp.77-104 | |||||
| 著者版フラグ | ||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||
| フォーマット | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
