@techreport{oai:kobe-cufs.repo.nii.ac.jp:00001225,
 author = {Shinkai, Tetsuya and Tanaka, Satoru and Okamura, Makoto},
 issue = {13},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {We consider the R&D investments competition of the two duopolistic firms in a weakly complementary technologies economy. By “the weakly complementary technologies”, we mean that each firm can produce goods without both of the two technologies but it incurs more redundant costs than that in the case each or both of the technologies may be available for it. By “the strongly complementary technologies,” we mean that the firm cannot produce the goods at all without the use of both of them. We derive the investments competition equilibria in R&D of the two weakly complementary technologies with and without the (cross-) licensing system. By comparing of the R&D investment levels in the two equilibria, we show that the (cross-) licensing system promotes the R&D investments when the duopolistic firms can produce goods by using of the two weakly complementary technologies., application/pdf},
 title = {Licensing (cross-licensing) system and R&D investments in a weakly complementary technologies economy},
 year = {2002}
}