@techreport{oai:kobe-cufs.repo.nii.ac.jp:00001211,
 author = {Esaka, Taro},
 issue = {37},
 month = {Aug},
 note = {This paper empirically evaluates the treatment effect of de facto pegged regimes on the occurrence of currency crises. To estimate the treatment effect of pegged regimes properly, we must carefully control for the self-selection problem of regime adoption because a country's exchange rate regime choice is nonrandom. However, because previous studies do not explicitly address this problem, these studies can lead to biased estimates of treatment effects. To address the self-selection problem, we thus employ a variety of propensity score matching methods. In addition, we use the covariate matching method of Abadie and Imbens (2006) to test the robustness of the results in propensity score matching methods. We find interesting and robust evidence that (1) pegged regimes significantly decrease the likelihood of currency crises compared with floating regimes, and (2) pegged regimes with capital account liberalization significantly lower the likelihood of currency crises compared with other regimes.},
 title = {Evaluating the effect of de facto pages on currency crises using matching methods},
 year = {2010}
}