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Michael HOLLENBACK

1. Introduction

The Global 30 (G30) program, lasting from 2009 to 2014, was tasked with aiding in increasing the number of international students in Japan to 300,000, almost tripling the number, and to help promote the overall internationalization of higher education (MEXT, 2009). However, upon its conception, continuing through its implementation, and eventually to its premature cancellation, the G30 program proved to be more a failure than a success. Furthermore, these failures reflected not only the inability of the program to reach its intended targets, but also a larger failure of the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) to internationalize the selected universities in terms of their organization or outlook.

Through the G30 program, MEXT utilized an interpretation of internationalization, which focused on Japanese economic and cultural power in the globalized neoliberal marketplace, while leaving many international students at the mercy of overly bureaucratized higher education institutions which were not equipped to adequately serve their needs or interests. In this interpretation, internationalization has little to do with aligning higher education institutions along international frameworks or norms, and does not seek to have individuals within the university attain a more international outlook or identity. These failures, unfortunately, illuminate the ambivalent position of the Japanese government towards language and education policy, especially as it concerns the wider societal use of the English language and the international 'other' as a group or individual in Japan. To understand the reasons for the failures of the G30 program, the intentions behind its inception and the methods of its execution must be explored and evaluated, and underlying questions about its explicit and implicit goals must be asked.

2. The Global 30 Program

2.1 Background of the program

With a birthrate among the lowest in the world, Japan's population first started to shrink in 2010 with the population of graduating secondary students eligible to continue onto higher education falling from 1.81 million in 1992 to just 1.09 million in 2008 (JASSO, 2009). During this same period, the number of higher education institutions in Japan rose to over 1,000 with an overall acceptance rate of 92.5% for those students who wished to enter tertiary education and an advancement rate of 77.6% of all graduating secondary students moving into different types of higher education (JASSO, 2009). This near parity of potential students to admitted students created a situation in which some smaller and medium-sized higher education institutions must rigorously compete for potential students in order to stay financially solvent. This overly accommodating admission process results in falling academic rigor and an overall dampening of Japan's academic prestige. One of the ways Japanese higher education and many universities are trying to fill their cohorts is by shifting towards increasing the numbers of international students (Walker, 2005). The ability of Japan to project itself as a hub of international education and research is essential to continue the trend of increasing the numbers of international students.

After a post-war economic boom, Japan became the dominant economic power in Asia and eventually the second largest economy in the world. Combined with the existing structure of former imperial national universities and successful private universities, Japan hosted some of the finest higher education institutions in the hemisphere. As the economies of East Asia developed, many of the elite sent their children to study in Japan, ostensibly to gain knowledge of Japanese business and technology, and bring that expertise back to their home countries. As student mobility increased even further with the rise of a wider Asian middle class in the early 2000s, Japan saw an influx of international students, reaching 100,000 in 2003 (JASSO, 2009). However, at the same time, these economically developing countries were also advancing their own education systems, and Japan began to lose its appeal as an education destination.

While this was happening, several companies, such as *Times Higher Education*, published rankings of the worlds' top universities according to their overall

reputation, research record, and level of international integration. While of questionable methodological rigor and applicability, these rankings impact the global impression of Japanese higher education. This is reflected by the fact that in 2013, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared the goal of elevating 10 Japanese institutions into the global top 100 by 2023 (Sawa, 2019).

As the Japanese higher education market grows more perilous and Japanese universities' international status has declined, the market for international students worldwide has grown immensely with some estimating the market to reach over $100 billion worldwide (Ruby, 2009). Schools from around the world are competing for a share of these international students, with institutions in English-speaking countries ranking among the most desirable destinations. English is the predominant lingua franca in academics, and the ability to provide courses and degrees in English is an important part of Japan being able to attract international students (Brown, 2018).

With these three predominant factors in the background, the G30 program was primarily concerned with increasing the numbers of research-oriented international students who could study at prestigious Japanese institutions in English. This would have the desired effect of improving the international rankings of these universities and raising the international profile of Japanese higher education, which could result in an overall increase of international students to all universities in the country. However, it can be seen from the goals of G30 that higher education internationalization was not conceptualized as shifting educational structures along international norms, or incorporating more international parties into the Japanese higher education system.

2.2 The Structure of the program

The G30 program, with the official Japanese name translating to 'Establishment of Hub for Internationalization' was first announced in 2009. MEXT would initially choose 13 universities that would receive special funding amounting to 200-400 million yen a year for five years, with the total amount reaching 15 billion yen (MEXT, 2009). Furthermore, an additional 17 universities would be chosen later with additional funding allotted to them. This is no small amount and would therefore result in fierce competition, as Japan consistently ranks near the bottom

among OECD nations in the amount of public spending on higher education (OECD, 2019). While there were behind-closed-doors discussions of the G30 program for many months, the formal announcement for the program with a call for applications was made in mid-April 2009 with a deadline set in mid-May and the announcement of the first 13 successful universities on July 3rd, 2009 (Ishikawa, 2011). This means that the entire process, including briefings to universities by MEXT, completion of applications, screening interviews and final selection by the committee took only two and a half months.

Among these first 13 institutions, 7 public (Kyoto University, Kyushu University, Nagoya University, Osaka University, Tohoku University, University of Tokyo, Tsukuba University) and 6 private universities (Doshisha University, Keio University, Meiji University, Ritsumeikan University, Sophia University, and Waseda University) were selected. All of these institutions were already among the most reputable and exclusive in Japan and are destinations of many of the brightest students in the country.

One of the notable areas that could have influenced the way in which schools were chosen for participation in G30 is that many of the policy-makers inside MEXT have traditionally been graduates of these elite universities (Ishikawa, 2011). In addition to the speedy selection process, the criteria that were used for selection raises questions as to the goals of the G30 program as decided by MEXT. Before taking a critical look at these criteria, it is important to note that information about how many and which schools applied for G30 as well as data about universities that did not apply or were not selected is largely unavailable. Therefore, we can only look at the selected institutions and evaluate them against a set of imagined standards about the intended goals of the G30 program and its focus on a particular type of internationalization.

One criterion for being selected was for an applicant university to have over 300 current international students from at least four different countries, meaning successful applicant universities must already have had some kind of logistical structure to handle an influx of new international students (Ishikawa, 2011). However, many schools that had the largest international student populations at the time of application were not selected for the initial group of 13 universities.

According to the Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO), which collects and publishes data on the numbers of international students in Japan, during 2009, the year in which the selections for the G30 program were made, among the top 10 universities with the largest international student bodies, 8 were selected for G30 (JASSO, 2009).

However, some schools with relatively small international student bodies (Keio University: rank #16, Meiji University: rank #23, Sophia University: rank #28, and Doshisha University: unranked) were also chosen as one of the initial 13 schools (JASSO, 2009). This shows some level of disconnect between the universities, which already were able to attract large numbers of international students and the ones that MEXT wanted to promote as hubs of internationalization. Another relevant factor is to compare the international student populations to the total student body. While many of the G30 universities boasted larger numbers of international students, no school selected for G30 had more than 10% international students among their total student body (Ishikawa, 2011). From this first criteria, it can be seen that the goal of the G30 program was not intended to improve the experiences of international students already in Japan, or to expand the ability of the universities with the largest international student bodies to provide quality education for both domestic and international students or to better integrate these two groups. Rather, it was intended to focus on several large prestigious universities with relatively large international student populations and make these institutions more attractive.

Another criteria for selection stipulated that universities must have issued more than 340 post-graduate degrees in the previous three years and have been selected to receive more than 130 grants-in-aid from the government-funded Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) (Ishikawa, 2011). This shows that MEXT preferred universities producing large numbers of graduate students, meaning those with the strongest research activities. However, the overwhelming focus on graduate students contradicts the typical profile of the majority of international students in Japan. JASSO (2009) reported that of the roughly 132,000 international students in Japan at the start of the G30 program, only 35,000 of them were graduate students. This again shows the disconnect between MEXT's desire to promote research and publications in English, with the reality of having the vast

majority of international students come from outside graduate-level programs.

The criteria for acceptance into the G30 program displayed that MEXT intended the program for large, research-oriented institutions that had large student bodies. While some international students fit this profile, the majority of international students when G30 was conceived were at smaller, more broad-based universities with smaller graduate programs. While the conditions of international students and the criteria for G30 seem to be at odds, if we view the intended goals not to bring institutions in line with international norms or to improve the educational conditions of international students, but rather to improve the global rankings of the selected universities, things align much more cleanly.

The most popular global rankings, published by *Times Higher Education* (THE), use several metrics to evaluate each university. Following the first criteria for selection into G30, the proportion of international students and faculty are one important metric for the rankings, with higher percentages meaning better scores (THE, 2018).

As the G30 program is seen as intended to increase overall international student numbers, this would immediately positively impact the ranking of each university. Another metric for the global rankings involves the amount of relevant research that is published by students and faculty in the university, which is usually measured by number of citations, typically in English language publications (THE, 2018). Having G30 universities focus predominantly on English-language graduate programs would also result in a larger amount of English-language research being published, which would again directly impact a university's ranking. In addition, as the other major factor in these global ranking system is a survey on the reputation of the school and its graduates (THE, 2018).

The idea that MEXT wished to use the G30 program to improve the global rankings of already prestigious universities in Japan is clear. Therefore, it can be seen that MEXT chose criteria for inclusion into G30 that would directly increase the global ranking of the selected universities by choosing the most prestigious and well-established universities in the country, and boosting their international student numbers and amount of published English-language research. This cynical

approach to internationalization means that the majority of international students already in Japan, or likely to come to Japan under existing systems would receive little to no benefit from the G30 program, and shows that there was no substantial emphasis on restructuring these institutions along more international lines.

2.3 Implementation of the program

After being selected, the action plan and subsequent goals for the 13 universities in the G30 program included 4 major points. The first action area involved setting up English-taught degree programs (ETP) in English. The 13 selected universities collectively pledged to establish 33 undergraduate and 124 graduate programs that would be ETPs, which would allow international students without Japanese ability to study (MEXT, 2009). As well, the selected schools collectively set a goal of increasing their international student body from a total of 16,000 in 2008 to over 50,000 in 5 years (Ishikawa, 2011). This shows that while the overall goal of the Japanese government was 300,000 students by 2020, the G30 program was intended to be an isolated endeavor, with little applicability for other universities to follow. Being able to study in English is an important factor for students who eventually participated in the G30 program (Aleles, 2015).

However, Japan had already amassed a body of over 100,000 international students by the start of the G30 program, with these students enrolling in programs that were mostly in the Japanese-language. The vast majority of these students came from East Asia, with 95% coming from the six countries of China, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand (JASSO, 2009). With the exception of Malaysia, these countries are not well known for producing a large number of English-language researchers that would enroll in graduate programs. Therefore, it can be seen that MEXT and the G30 program focused on countries that did not traditionally send large numbers of international students to Japan.

As well, the ability of Japanese students to participate in these new ETPs was not guaranteed by the MEXT guidelines in the G30 program. 6 of the 7 national universities chosen limited enrollment in their ETP to students who were not citizens or permanent residents of Japan while none of the six private universities had the same restriction (Yonezawa, 2010). This amount of variety is largely due to the universities being left to interpret the procedure needed to meet the G30 goals

in their own ways, with each university creating their own process. The resulting academic segregation of student groups displays that internationalization efforts that would increase contact between Japanese and international students was not a major concern for MEXT.

Furthermore, the quality of the established ETPs suffered from wide variety between each participating institution (Chapple, 2014). Some programs would be taught by current professors, simply translating their materials and tests into English and then conducting lectures in English. This system was sometimes enacted without a thorough check of the professors' English ability, and without the professors' agreement to teach English language courses (Heigham, 2014). In some G30 universities, additional international faculty were hired to teach classes in the ETPs, but while these new international faculty may or may not be more qualified to lecture in English as a matter of linguistic ability, their ability to teach the subject the course or program can be questioned if they were hired without the requisite academic background.

Moreover, while some schools created English versions of existing programs, others created entirely new programs of cobbled together courses, which created a kind of disassociated program cohesion (Yonezawa, 2011). A lack of guidelines from MEXT and no mandated ETP assessment meant that G30 students might have received an education not at the same quality as Japanese students in the same institution.

Another action plan of the G30 program focused on improving the overall support system and services for international students in admissions, daily life, language education, and future employment (MEXT, 2009). This type of institutional support for international students is absolutely necessary and was rightly included by MEXT as one of the major areas of improvement for participating universities. Bradford (2016) discusses the linguistic, cultural, administrative and managerial, and institutional challenges that arise from the implementation of ETP for students, instructors, and administrative staff at universities.

However, MEXT provided no further instructions about how this support system should be structured or integrated into the existing systems for student services. At

some institutions, entirely separate offices were established to handle international student services with extreme cases involving international students using an entirely different set of facilities and services (Hashimoto, 2013a). One example of this separation of services involves student housing. In 2014, the year the G30 program was cancelled, over 25,000 international students lived in special housing intended for international students, with only roughly 6,000 international students living in general student housing (JASSO, 2014).

While some institutions allowed Japanese and international students to share housing designated as international or general, the open-ended G30 guidelines made it possible for institutions to completely separate their international and domestic student bodies if they desired. It is clear that if a students' nationality creates a separate program and support services, a university can not be thought of as internationalized in terms of their ability to integrate international peoples and norms into higher education (Hashimoto, 2013a). While another G30 project action item was the inclusion of high-quality instruction of Japanese language and culture, this was included initially as a support service for international students, and was never considered as an academic endeavor for students participating in newly established ETP under G30 (Ishikawa, 2011).

The fourth, and final, action plan was to set up overseas recruitment offices to be shared by universities both within G30 and outside the program (MEXT, 2009). Of the 13 selected universities for the G30 program, 8 were chosen to receive additional funding to set up these offices. However, the selection of locations for these offices raises questions in how these universities sought to attract students that could conduct research in English, or increase their general international student body from regions that did not historically send large numbers of international students.

Kyushu University set up an office in Cairo, Egypt, Waseda University in Bonn, Germany, Tohoku University in Moscow and Novosibirsk, Russia, Ritsumeikan University in New Delhi, India, Tokyo University in Hyderabad, India, Nagoya University in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and Kyoto University in Hanoi, Vietnam (MEXT, 2009). Vietnam is the only country ranked among the top 5 countries that sent international students to Japan in 2009, with 3,199 students (JASSO, 2009). In

that same year, India, Germany, Egypt, Russia, and Uzbekistan collectively sent 1,849 international students to Japan (JASSO, 2009).

This collective number would have ranked at just #9, behind China, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, the United States, and Indonesia. Therefore, there doesn't seem to be a clear reason why these locations were selected to help attract international students to Japan. Many of those countries are not famous for producing large numbers of English-language research students, nor did they have a track record of sending many international students to Japan. Again, without intervention by MEXT to guide G30 universities in choosing locations that would better represent the current international student body, participating institutions selected locations for their recruitment offices based on their own interests and desires, which are often at odds.

An exploration of the structure of the G30 program showed that MEXT valued improving the global rankings of prestigious universities in Japan by focusing on the metrics used to rank these institutions over providing better services to international students or to better integrate international and domestic student bodies. In the same way, the implementation of the G30 program displays that participating universities routinely isolated G30 students through the creation of separate ETP academic programs and international student services.

Furthermore, the ability of universities to recruit students into these programs was entirely left up to university specific agendas, instead of any centralized effort from MEXT. The myriad ways in which the G30 universities interpreted the means to achieve the goals of the G30 program exhibits a lack of planning from MEXT, which resulted in varying quality of programs and services between universities. Hashimoto (2013a) comments that the implicit attitudes of MEXT was that the G30 program was always intended to exist as a separate entity from the wider university as a whole, despite claims of broad-based internationalization.

3. Outcomes of the Global 30 Program

After the financial crisis of 2008, the Japanese government cut higher education funding by 100 billion yen in 2011, and by another 300 billion over the next three years (Ishikawa, 2011). This started the beginning of the end of the G30 program.

Though the initial 13 schools continued to receive funding, the additional 17 schools were never chosen and the program was completely ended in 2014. While the G30 program met a premature end, we can look at the outcomes of G30 to further investigate whether it failed in its stated goals, as we have already established the failure of MEXT and the G30 universities to promote internationalization as the cooperation between domestic and international parties in higher education. The predominant goal of the G30 project was to increase the international student population, so the first outcome to explore is to look at international student bodies for each G30 University.

Table 1 shows data from 2009 and 2014 (Ishikawa, 2011, JASSO, 2009, 2014). It is important to note that these numbers reflect the total numbers of international students in each institution, and do not isolate the numbers of students in either Japanese language programs or ETPs that were created under the G30 program nor between undergraduate and graduate programs in each university. Therefore, these trends must be looked at more generally to investigate how the G30 program impacted international student populations.

While it can be seen that every university that participated in G30 increased their international student body population, the amount of relative increase in almost every institution is rather small. While the G30 program existed for only 5 years, with the final target to be met in 2020, one would hope that each university would be roughly 50% of the way towards their goal by 2014. However, there is no university that is more than 35% of the way to their target international student population, with 6 of the 13 schools at less than 15% of the way towards their goal. If we accept the numbers that were decided by each institution to be appropriate, the G30 program can only be seen as a failure to meet these target international student numbers.

Another area that can be examined are which countries sent the most international students to Japan, and how this changed after the end of the G30 program. With the increase in ETP programs in the G30 universities, and the establishment of recruitment centers in Egypt, Germany, India, Russia, and Uzbekistan, an increase in the number of students from countries that have strong English language education and/or a recruitment center would be expected. Table 2 displays the

countries sending the most international students to Japan in 2009 and 2014 (JASSO 2009, 2014). Again, these numbers reflect the total numbers of international students, in both Japanese language and newly established ETP programs, as well as more broadly in graduate and undergraduate programs, as well as junior college and technical universities.

Table 1. Comparative International Student Body in Japan

University	Total # of int'l students in 2009 [A]	Target # of int'l students by 2020 [B]	Additional # of students to meet 2020 target (B-A) [C]	Total # of int'l students in 2014 [D]	Increase # of int'l students from 2009 to 2014 (D-A) [E]	Percentage of target increase # by 2014 (E/C)
Waseda University	3114	8000	4886	4306	1192	24.39%
University of Tokyo	2473	3500	1027	2798	325	31.64%
Tsukuba University	1522	4500	2978	1889	367	12.32%
Osaka University	1509	3000	1491	2012	503	33.73%
Kyushu University	1509	3900	2391	1972	463	19.36%
Kyoto University	1407	3200	1793	1725	318	17.73%
Tohoku University	1344	3211	1867	1532	188	10.06%
Nagoya University	1344	3000	1656	1668	324	19.56%
Ritsumeikan University	1230	4005	2775	1440	210	7.56%
Keio University	1053	4000	2947	1303	250	8.48%
Meiji University	786	4000	3214	1095	309	9.61%
Sophia University	675	2600	1925	914	239	12.41%
Doshisha University	343	3500	3157	1273	930	29.45%

In Table 2 it can be seen that many countries boasting the largest numbers of international students, and those with the largest increases between 2009 and 2014 again do not fit into the areas focused on by the G30 program. As well, of those

countries specifically targeted by the G30 program, with the establishment of recruitment centers, the increases have a wide variation. Russia, Uzbekistan and Germany show increases well above the total average, while India is slightly below the overall average. Egypt shows an overall decline in international student numbers, probably owing to the political situation in the country after the Arab Spring revolution in 2011.

Table 2. International Students to Japan by Country

Country	Number of Int'l Students in Japan - 2009 (A)	Number of Int'l Students in Japan - 2014 (B)	Percentage Change (B/A)
Japan Total	132,720	184,155	38.75%
China	79,082 (#1)	94,399 (#1)	19.36%
South Korea	19,605 (#2)	15,777 (#3)	-19.52%
Taiwan	5,332 (#3)	6.231 (#5)	16.86%
Vietnam	3,199 (#4)	26,439 (#2)	826.47%
Malaysia	2,395 (#5)	2,475 (#8)	3.34%
Thailand	2,360 (#6)	3,250 (#6)	37.71%
United States	2,230 (#7)	2,152 (#9)	-3.49%
Indonesia	1,996 (#8)	3,188 (#7)	59.71%
Nepal	1,628 (#10)	10,448 (#4)	641.76%
France	624 (#14)	957 (#13)	53.36%
India	543 (#15)	727 (#16)	33.88%
Philippines	528 (#16)	753 (#15)	42.61%
Germany	450 (#17)	713 (#17)	58.44%
England	427 (#18)	502 (#21)	17.56%
Canada	345 (#19)	340 (#27)	-1.44%
Australia	331 (#21)	345 (#26)	4.22%
Egypt	329 (#22)	268 (#30)	-18.54%
Russia	304 (#23)	589 (#19)	93.75%
Uzbekistan	223 (#27)	358 (#25)	60.53%

As well, English speaking countries (United States, England, Australia, Canada) and former Anglosphere colonies (Philippines, Malaysia) showed wide varieties in the changing numbers of international students coming to Japan.

However, the two countries that saw the most dramatic increases were Vietnam and

Nepal, which suddenly became two of the biggest sources of international students. In addition, when comparing official numbers in 2009 and 2014, JASSO changed the way in which they counted international students. While in 2009 the numbers included students enrolled in undergraduate, graduate, technical and junior college programs, in 2014, JASSO also added groups of students who enrolled into Japanese language study programs (JASSO, 2009, 2014). Many of these students might be enrolled in these programs for only a few months, while others might study for more than a year in hopes of using their acquired Japanese language ability to gain admission into a Japanese language undergraduate or graduate program.

So again, while the overall numbers of international students increased, there is little evidence that G30 significantly impacted on the numbers of students coming to Japan in general, and the inclusion of a previously ignored student body might have had more to do with numerical increases than any educational or language policy that was enacted by MEXT.

Another area to investigate is the effect that the G30 program had on the international rankings of the participant universities. Table 3 shows a selection of rankings of G30 universities and some composite scores in 2009 and in 2014 published by *Times Higher Education* (THE, 2009, 2014). Universities without rankings (Ritsumeikan University, Keio University, Meiji University, Sophia University, Doshisha University) are excluded from the table. It is important to note that Times Higher Education constantly increases the number of universities in their world rankings and the rankings underwent a change in methodology in 2011, so it is possible that there are many different factors that have affected the world rankings.

According to the data reported in Table 3 it is clear to see that every single university that participated in the G30 program saw their international ranking fall by the end of the program. Some universities fell hundreds of places in the five years the G30 program existed. As well, few universities saw their composite scores for international students and outlook or citations increase. While this is due to a number of factors that were mentioned previously, it is clear that the ability of the G30 program to improve the global rankings of participant universities was an

abject failure.

Table 3. Times Higher Education rankings of the G30 universities

University	Int'l Ranking in 2009	'Int'l Students' Score in 2009 (/100)	'Citations' Score in 2009 (/100)	Int'l Ranking in 2014	'Int'l Outlook' Score in 2014 (/100)	'Citations' Score in 2014 (/100)
Waseda University	#148	30	23	#351-400	N/A	N/A
University of Tokyo	#22	42	70	#23	29.6	69.8
Tsukuba University	#174	36	45	#301-350	32.6	48.9
Osaka University	#43	33	68	#157	27.6	50.4
Kyushu University	#155	34	63	#351-400	30.9	24.5
Kyoto University	#25	26	85	#59	27.5	58.2
Tohoku University	#97	32	57	#165	29.3	47.3
Nagoya University	#92	34	61	#226-250	55.1	28

As we have seen, the G30 program first failed to view internationalization as a way for higher education institutions to incorporate international groups and individuals into institutions, or to reform institutions along international norms or standards. Instead, the G30 program sought to improve the status of prestigious schools in Japan through focusing on metrics that would improve the global rankings of these schools, while significantly increasing the proportion of international students at these universities. Unfortunately, even for the stated goals of the G30 program, the vast majority of these agenda items failed to result in a positive impact.

4. Discussion and Conclusion
The G30 program was one that recognized the hegemony of English as Lingua Franca (ELF), especially in academia, and tried to improve Japan's position within this paradigm. To say nothing of the colonial and imperial history that brought this

paradigm into being, ELF is a reflection of the globalized neoliberal economy, which has shaped educational systems around the world (Pennycook, 1998). There has long been a debate about the influence of globalization and internationalization and the various uses of these terms in Japanese higher education but generally these can be interpreted as the development of the Japanese economy internationally (Hashimoto, 2009; Yonezawa, 2010; 2011). It can be seen that the implicit goals of G30 can be viewed through this lens of internationalization as economic development and the explicit maintenance of Japanese national identity (Hashimoto, 2000).

In a study conducted by Yonezawa, Akiba, and Hirouchi (2009), the presidents of many of Japan's universities responded to a survey about their perception of internationalization within their institutions with over 75% of these university leaders perceiving internationalization as a way to develop Japan's global economic competitiveness, and only a third perceiving it as a way to develop political, cultural, and academic alliances with foreign countries. Following this line of thought, internationalization as conceived by MEXT into educational and language policy is not a force of identity formation for students, but rather a tool for the promotion of Japanese economic power in the global economy (Le Ha, 2013; Yoshino, 1995). Furthermore, economic globalization is viewed in Japan as a form of adversity to be handled through the advocacy of the national image of Japan, reflected in their educational and language policy (Burgess, Gibson, Klaphake & Selzer, 2010; Hashimoto, 2009; 2013b; Lincicome, 2005). This is evident in the definition of internationalization in educational and language policy through not focusing on the development of international students' agency in Japan or the development of an international outlook by Japanese students.

The G30 program was one that declared the intention to internationalize Japanese higher education, and was funded with 15 billion yen. However, the way in which internationalization was interpreted had a profound effect on how educational and language policy embedded in such a program was conceived of and implemented. Following the paradigm of education as human capital investment in the globalized neoliberal economy, MEXT formulated G30 in order to improve the international standings of elite Japanese universities, improving the economic and other 'soft' powers of the nation. Developing the international outlook of Japanese students,

overhauling Japanese universities' procedures to fall more in line with international standards, or increasing the ability of Japanese students to use English for communication; these are all areas that were possible through alternative internationalization programs, but would be antithetical to the action plans that were formulated by MEXT and enacted at most participating institutions. Therefore, MEXT, and the Japanese government at large, do not conceive of English as a language of social use or expression, but rather of economic development. As well, education is not viewed as a process of the development of individual identity formation, but rather that of national identification and human capital investment towards national economic development.

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Abstract

The Global 30 (G30) program was tasked with aiding in increasing the number of international students and to promote the overall internationalization of higher education in Japan. However, upon its conception, continuing through its implementation, and eventually to its premature cancellation, the G30 program proved to be more failure than success. This paper discusses how the G30 program failed in its aims, both in explicit increases in international students as well as implicit improvement in the international outlook of higher education institutions in Japan.

Keywords: Internationalization, Globalization, Education Policy, Language Policy, International Students